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The paper examines the link between Non-state armed Islamist groups’ terrorism and 
global domestic insurgency, using Nigeria as a case study. It adopts a combination of 
deprivation – frustration – aggression theory, social learning and social identity theories 
as its framework of analysis. The primary focus of inquiry is on secondary data, purposively 
sampled from books, journals articles, and reports of periodicals, internet and existing 
statistics. Qualitative research and secondary data analysis method were adopted.  Using 
discourse, descriptive and explanatory techniques, the paper attempts to establish the 
relationship between Non-state armed Islamist groups’ support and Boko Haram 
insurgency in Nigeria. Findings from the study show that Boko Haram’s insurgency is 
connected with the Non-state armed Islamist groups’ support, cooperation and 
collaboration.  Moreover, Boko Haram insurgency is also a direct consequence of 
cumulative deprivation and frustration caused by inequality, economic deprivation, 
poverty, unemployment, corruption and bad governance in Nigeria.  The paper concludes 
by suggesting that transitional joint military taskforce should be established with 
neighboring countries, while the issues of governance, socio-cultural and economic factors 
that cause poverty, inequality and deprivation should be addressed through good 
governance. 
 
 
     he Global War on Terrorism (GNOT) seized the world’s attention in late 2001 as a result 
of dramatic and destructive attack of World Trade Centre in New York City and overarching 
military pentagon building in Washington, DC, on September, 11 2001. The terrorist attack 
was well planned, coordinated and executed. Since then, terrorism took a different form and 
spreading all over the world. The number of attacks by non-state armed Islamist groups and 
their collaborations with domestic insurgents around the world increased rapidly over the 
years. Between 1969 and 1985, for instance, the number of major international terrorist 
attacks alone jumped from just two hundred to over eight hundred per year, leaving more and 
more people afraid and polarized in their opinions.  According to Homeland Security News 
Wire (2014), a total of 7,217 attacks were recorded.  In 2013, the number increased to 18,524 
(150 per cent). Throughout the world, terrorism re-invents itself in new and more dangerous 
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forms.  As older groups are defeated and exhausted, more radical and violent successors often 
take their places. Domestic insurgencies emerged and linked to non-state armed Islamist 
group networks. 
Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad known as Boko Haram in Nigeria 
is an extremist Islamic group that has engaged in guerrilla warfare across the Northern part 
of Nigeria. It’s violent and suicide attacks on civilians, churches, government officials and 
United Nations have turned the country into a theatre of bloodshed and insecurity for lives 
and properties. It is on record that between January 1, 2012 and April 2014, Nigeria has 
witnessed over fifty cases of bomb blasts across the county with estimated 10,000 deaths 
and kidnapping of 270 girls from Government Girl’s Secondary School, Chibok, Borno 
State, that has attracted international outrage (Pernice 2013). 
Boko Haram Sect was founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002 and the organization 
seeks to establish a “pure” Islamic state ruled by Sharia law, putting a stop to what it deems 
“westernization”. It is suspected to have cells in Northern Cameroon, Chad and Niger. It 
exerts influence in the North Eastern Nigerian states of Borno, Adamawa, Kaduna, Bauchi, 
Yobe, Taraba and Kano. It is suspected to have links with other non-state armed Jihadist 
groups outside Nigeria. A range of conflicting narratives persist around Boko Haram and 
the group’s origins, motivations and future plans remain a  matter of debate 
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to examine the suspected link between Boko 
Haram insurgency and Non-state armed Islamist groups outside Nigeria. Besides, the paper 
attempts to identify the cultural, social, economic and political motives behind the Boko 
Haram insurgency in Nigeria. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Against this background, three questions drive this investigation. First, what are 
the socio-economic, cultural, religious and political factors that motivated Boko Haram 
insurgency in Nigeria? Second, how are Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria linked with N 
on-State armed Islamists groups’ activities? Third, what are the policy implications to 
public management, political leaders, socio-economic and culture for national 
development? Before we examine these questions, let us define some relevant concepts for 
our discussion in order to formulate the theoretical framework and contextualize our 
analysis. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS AND THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
Terrorism is increasingly understood as a political act meant to inflict dramatic and 
deadly injury on civilians and to create an atmosphere of acute fear and despair (generally 
for a political or ideological, whether secular or religious, purpose). The use of violence 
is to create fear, often through the targeting of third parties and with the elements of surprise 
and the undermining of very personal security, is a tool used by a variety of historical and 
contemporary actors (Paret 1964). The term terrorism is difficult to define. However, 
terrorism can mean the use of violence by states against subjects; isolated extremist acts of 
violence; the use of violence in liberation and nationalist movements; and emergent 
transnational configuration which targets western hegemony or values. Terrorism is, in most 
cases, resentfully a political act. It is meant to inflict dramatic and deadly injury on 
civilians and to create an atmosphere of fear for a political or ideological (secular or 
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religions) purpose. It is also a criminal act and contravenes international law. For the 
purpose of this paper, terrorism is defined as politically-motivated violence perpetrated 
against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents intended to 
influence an audience or change a constituted state authority recognized by United Nations 
by subversion. 
The Non-state armed Islamist groups are religious extremists suspected to be 
collaborating and instigating domestic insurgencies in most parts of the world, including 
Nigeria in the pretense of pursuing global Jihadist’s ideology. For example, twelve (12) 
top most active non-state armed Islamist groups have been identified in 2013 as having 
links with domestic insurgencies occurring in most parts of the world. They include: 
Barisan, Revolusi Nasional (Thailand); Taliban (Afghanistan and Pakistan; Islam Chatra 
Shir (Bangladesh); Communist Party of India (Moist); Al-Quaida in Islamic M aghreb 
(AQIM) in Algeria and Iraq; Al-Shabaab (Somalia); Ansaru (Algeria/M ali); 
ISIS/Khorasan (Syria and Iraq); Communist Party of India (Moist); New People’s Army 
(Philippines); Touareg Fighters (Mali and Niger) and Jabhat ql-Nusra (Syria). Domestic 
Islamist insurgency activities in most parts of the world have been fingered against these 
non-state armed Islamists groups (Homeland Security News Wire 2014). 
An insurgency is an armed rebellion against a constituted authority recognized by 
the United Nations, when those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as 
belligerents (Roberts and Ash 2009). An insurgency can be fought via counter-insurgency 
warfare and may also be opposed by measures to protect the population and by political and 
economic actions of various kinds aimed at undermining the insurgent’s claims against the 
incumbent regime. However, the nature of insurgencies is an ambiguous concept. Not all 
rebellions are insurgencies. There are many cases of non-violent rebellions using civil 
resistance (Morris 2005). Where a revolt takes the form of armed rebellion, it may not be 
viewed as an insurgency if a state of belligerency exists between one or more sovereign 
States and rebel forces. However, when insurgency is used by a State or another authority 
under threat, “insurgency” also carries an implication that rebels’ cause is illegitimate, 
whereas those rising up will see the authority as being illegitimate. Not all insurgencies 
include terrorism. Morris argues that the use or non-use of terrorism does not define 
insurgency, but that organizational traits have traditionally provided another means to 
describe the two. Insurgencies normally field fighting forces orders of magnitude larger 
than those of terrorist organizations provide social services and have an overt, even legal, 
political wing. Their covert wing “carries out attacks on military forces with tactics such 
as raids and ambushes, as well as acts of terror such as attacks that cause deliberate civilian 
Causalities” (International Crisis Group Working to Prevent Conflict Worldwide 2014, 1 
- 16). In this paper, we adopt US Department of Defense’s definition that insurgency is an 
organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of 
subversion and armed conflict. 
Counter-insurgency, on the other hand, has a different type of operation to 
insurgency. Though, insurgency and counter-insurgency (COIN) are two sides of 
phenomenon, both have been called revolutionary war or internal war. Counter-insurgency 
is, therefore, defined in this paper as an inter-locking system of actions – political, 
economic, psychological and military aimed at neutralizing insurgency’s intended action 
of overthrowing established authority in a country. 
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THEORETICAL FRAM EWORK OF ANALYSIS 
Among the most important assumptions of the behaviorist school are the belief that 
the root causes of war lie in human nature and human behavior and that an important 
relationship exists between intra-personal conflict and conflict that pervades the external 
social order. Among the prevalent micro-theories that we will review are: instinct or innate 
theories of aggression, frustration – aggression theory, social learning theory and social 
identity theory. 
Early psychologists often postulate that there was an innate instinctual or biological 
mechanism which would predispose humans towards aggression. This theory combined 
elements of early psychological studies (Freud’s death instinct) and social Darwinian 
theories regarding the fight for survival. This theory was subsequently discredited by 
biologists who did not believe that such a mechanism exist. 
Like most pioneering theories, the innate theories gave way to more sophisticated 
and scientific hypotheses over time. One important development of this work was the 
evolution of the frustration –Aggression theory. The basic assumption of the frustration – 
Aggression theory is that all aggression, whether interpersonal or international has its root 
causes on the frustration of one or more actors’ goal achievement. That is, the unful- filment 
of personal or group objectives and the frustration that this breeds. Since the demand for 
basic human needs has always exceeded the supply, all human conflict can be traced to an 
actor’s failure to obtain what it needs. The frustration-Aggression theory rests on the basic 
stimulus–response (frustration –aggression) hypothesis (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990). 
Terrorism can be driven by frustration, oppression, exploitation and social inequalities. The 
use of terror and violence by terrorist groups is aimed to intimidate or coerce government 
and the public in order to promote political, social ideological and religious or philosophical 
objectives. Looking at Boko Haram, terrorist attacks in the Northern Nigeria, one can 
affirm that the astronomically relative deprivations in terms of western education 
acquisition and poverty, unemployment generation, and social inequalities, could have been 
the reasons that trigger terrorism in that part of the country. In this context, aggression may 
develop as a consequence of having been exposed to an extremely frustrating conditions 
sufficient enough to provoke a sense of worthiness and hopelessness. Kukah (1993) argues 
in favor of this position that Boko Haram members face complexities, contradictions and 
challenges emanating from their inability to meet up with basic human needs like foods,  
cloth and shelter. Soyinka (2012) agrees with this position and argues that, “economic 
factors, such as unemployment, wasted resources, social marginalization and massive 
corruption are responsible for nurturing the current season of violent discontent in Nigeria”. 
It is, however, important to note that the existence of frustration does not always lead to 
aggression, given that frustration may have other consequences other than aggression. 
However, the insufficiency of causal link to aggression and other insights into human 
behavior have led to the discrediting of the frustration-Aggression theory and the 
subsequent development of the social learning and social identity theories.  
Social learning theory is based on the hypothesis that aggression is not innate, 
instinctual but actually learned through the process of socialization. One acquires aggressive 
attributes by learning them at home, in school and by interaction with their environment 
in general. Interaction in society helps to focus and trigger stored aggression against 
economies. This is an important concept, particularly when the conflict is ethno-national 
or sectarian in nature. Social learning theorists have tried to understand the relationship of 
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the individuals in their environment and how this relates to sectarian aggression. Faleti 
(2006) looks at the causes of terrorist act in Nigeria through the lens of psycho-cultural 
perspectives. He contends that psychological, religious and other cultural contradictions are 
the basis of conflict and that such conflicts are intractably perennial. Religious influences in 
terms of Islamic jihads and solidarity with global Islamic fundamentalists motivate other 
jihadists. The terrorist activities of Al-Qaeda, Taliban and ISIS in Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Libya, Mali and Middle East motivate others to learn their mode of 
operations and military tactics, which are eventually imported for domestic insurgencies 
(Faleti 2006). 
Another theory of interest is the Social Identity theory. This was developed by 
Psychologist Henri Tajfel in 1998 and offers insight into the conflict in Northern Ireland. 
The basic focus of the theory is that we create our social relations. There is a human need 
for positive self-esteem and self-worth, which we transfer to our groups. We also order 
our environment by social comparison between groups. The concept of in-group and out-
group is important in this analysis. The social identity theory has helped Social 
Psychologists at least to recognize that individuals are different in groups and that it is this 
difference which produces recognizable forms of group action. For example, ethnic 
identities are very strong because of their composition as extended in kinship groups. 
People in similar conditions, such as: abject poverty, unemployment, social inequalities and 
marginalized groups can be united together to fight a common enemy. The kinship groups 
are important in the development of in-groups and out-groups. This is a particularly 
important concept when dealing with ethnic conflict or social inequality. Jerrold (2008) 
attributed Boko Haram insurgency to psychology of group identity for marginalized or 
isolated group of people. 
The paper, therefore, adopts a combination of deprivation-frustration-aggression 
theory, social learning theory and social identity theory as the framework of analysis for the 
subject matter. The deprivation-frustration-aggression theory would be the major focus, 
while social learning and social identity theories would complement it because of the 
shortcomings of deprivation-frustration-aggression theory. The deprivation-frustration-
aggression theory argues that aggression is the consequence of deprivation with resultant 
frustration. Individuals are motivated to achieve life ambitions and fulfill certain soc ial 
expectations, but when these expectations are thwarted, frustration sets in and this leads to 
some form of aggression. In Nigeria, especially in the North East, majority of the people are 
deprived of basic infrastructure; there are pervasive unemployment, abject poverty and 
basic infrastructure. Consequent upon these, frustration and aggression result, which often 
manifest in the form of militancy, terrorism and insurgency as witnessed mostly in North-
East of Nigeria. 
The justification for the use of the Social learning theory for this analysis is the 
attribute that aggression is acquired by learning them at home, in school and by interaction 
with their environment. The Boko Haram Jihadists were socialized to believe that other 
religious denominations other than Islam are infidels. Hence, their interactions with 
other Islamist groups in other parts of the world trigger stored aggression against 
common enemies. This explains Boko Haram’s insurgency against western education, 
Christians, churches, government officials and security officials. 
The Social identity theory in the framework attempts to explain the social division 
among individuals in different groups. Members of Boko Haram Sect see themselves as 
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distinct people that would Islamize the Northern Nigeria within Global Islamic Jihad. 
Hence, this difference produces group action and aggression against other religious groups 
and Islamic organizations believed to tolerate other religious bodies in Nigeria. The paper, 
therefore, adopts eclectic approach (that is, combination of deprivation-frustration – 
Aggression, social learning and social identity theories) for our analysis. This is justified 
because of socio-economic, religious and cultural identity experienced by citizens in 
Nigeria, especially in the North East which have contributed to aggression against the state 
and others perceived as enemies. 
 
METHODICAL APPROACH 
In the light of this, the paper adopts qualitative case study design. Data were 
purposively sampled from secondary sources such as: available statistics from global 
terrorism index reports, internet, journal articles, newspapers’ reports and textbooks. 
Collected data were coded, categorized and analyzed, using documentary, exploratory and 
descriptive analytical techniques, (percentages) to explain the link between Non-State 
armed Islamist groups and Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Historical and discourse 
analyses were also utilized where necessary for explaining the history, conversations and 
video messages of Boko Haram and non-state armed Islamist groups leaders. The 
contemporariness of the Boko Haram issue in Nigeria justifies the use of historical, 
exploratory, discourse, descriptive and explanatory techniques for our analysis and 
consequent sets of generalization and conclusion. 
 
LIM ITATIONS 
Lack of statistical records, accuracy of data and research reports, especially the 
collaboration between non-state armed Islamist groups with Boko Haram insurgency are 
limitations to this inquiry. Besides, the logistics, time, money and lack of access to leaders 
of Boko Haram sect and classified documents from government’s security officials on 
fatalities that occurred due to the activities of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria are other 
aspects of limitations of the paper. Furthermore, the findings cannot be generalized to 
other parts of the world where domestic insurgencies are taking place. However, the 
paper attempts to achieve its objectives because of the methods adopted for the 
investigation and analysis. Moreover, the inquiry being a case study would give us an 
insight into the contributory factors to Boko Haram insurgency and provide us with 
baseline data concerning the link between non-state armed Islamist groups and Boko 
Haram insurgency in Nigeria. This would direct us on ways to resolve religious 
fanaticism and extremism. 
 
ANALYSIS 
SOCIO-ECONOM IC AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 
North Central/ Eastern states in Nigeria (Kano, Adamawa, Bauchi, Bornu, Gombe, 
Taraba and Yobe), which are currently under the shadow of insurgency are vast areas 
with great potentials, but still remain the poorest part of Nigeria. Poor leadership, 
unequal distribution of resources, lack of basic education, over-population, absence of 
employment opportunities, including environmental degradation have contributed to 
entrenching abject poverty in the North East. Now, let us examine the socio-economic 
profile of four Northern states of Nigeria- target of Boko H aram Attacks and three 
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Southern States not vulnerable to attacks to enable us capture the picture of state of 
affairs in the socio-economic perspectives. 
 
TABLE 1: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF 
UNAFFECTED SOUTHERN STATES AND AFFECTED NORTH 
CENTRAL/EASTERN STATES IN NIGERIA 
STATES  GDP 
$bn 
(2012) 
GDP/Capital Unemployment 
(percent) 
Secondary School 
Attendance Rate 
(percent) 
AFFECTED 
NORTH 
    
Central/Eastern 
States 
16.8 1,525 28 28 
Kano 8 1,631 29.1 8 
Borno 4.6 1,233 33.8 11 
Adamawa 3.3 1,207 35.6 7 
Yobe 31.2 2,916 8.3 85 
UNAFFECTED 
SOUTHERN 
STATES 
    
Lagos 11.3 1,859 25.5 75 
Rivers 
Anambra 
8.9 1,814 12.4 73 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Poverty Profile Report (2012). 
 
FINDINGS 
(1) An evaluation of table 1 below shows that the North East has been particularly 
affected by bad governance; social inequality; lack of economic opportunit ies; 
lack of school attendance; unemployment and poverty in the region; compared to 
State from Southern part of Nigeria. Hence, it became a fertile group for youths 
to b easily recruited into Boko Haram Sect for terrorists’ activities in Nigeria.  
(2) Empirical evidences analyzed from video tapes, reports, and statements of Boko 
Haram leaders, leading to incidents of attacks as illustrated in table 2 and figure 
1 show that Boko Haram Sect has links with Non-state armed Islamist groups 
of AQI M /Ansaru;(A lgeria/Iraq); Al-Qaeda/Taliban (Afghanistan/Pakistan); 
Al-Shabaab(Somalia); and Touareg Fighters (Mali). 
 
DISCUSSION 
An evaluation of the data in table 1 above shows the backwardness of North Eastern 
States, the base of Boko Haram insurgency compared to states from the Southern parts o 
Nigeria. The performances of states from Southern part of Nigeria on school attendance are 
Lagos (85 per cent), Rivers (75 percent) and Anambra (72 percent). They have higher 
school attendance rates than the states from North East, comprising Kano, which record 
(28 percent), Bornu (8 per cent), Adamawa (11 percent), and Yobe (7 percent), respectively 
The gap between the Northern and Southern states is now complicated by the insidious 
targeting of education by insurgents. For example, the killing of students and kidnapping 
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of “270 Chiboks girls” on 5th May, 2014, that attracted international attention. 
Unemployment rates are also higher in the Northern states than the Southern states. Kano 
records (28 percent), Borno (29.1percent), Adamawa (33.8 percent) and Yobe (35.6 
percent); while, states from the Southern part of Nigeria have lower unemployment rates. 
Lagos has unemployment rate of (8.3 percent), Rivers (25.5 percent) and Anambra (12.4 
percent). The World Bank report of 2013 shows that there are massive and high poverty 
and unemployment rates in Nigeria, especially in rural areas from 12 percent in 2006 to 
24 percent in 2011. North East poverty rates amount to 69.1 percent absolute and relative 
poverty level of 76.3 per cent, respectively; while the Northern Nigeria’s poverty level 
is above 70 percent, than that of the South (Report 201 3). 
It can be inferred from the analysis of table 1 that North Eastern states have been 
particularly affected by lack of school attendance and unemployment rates because and lack 
of economic opportunities and poverty in the region, compared to States from Southern part 
of Nigeria. Besides, the failure of governance and corruption at the national and regional 
levels compounded the economic development of North Eastern states made up of Borno, 
Adamawa, Yobe, Gombe Taraba and Bauchi. From Nigerian Poverty Profile Report (2012) 
the North East, base of the murderous Islamist group Boko Haram, had 69.1 percent and 
76.3 percent absolute and relative poverty levels, respectively. While Northern Nigeria’s 
poverty rate as a whole is above 70 percent- double that in the South. The North East has 
been particularly hit hard as the lack of economic opportunities in the region drives people 
into the arm of radical Islamism, leading to a vicious cycle of poverty and 
underdevelopment. The problem is now being complicated by the insidious targeting of 
education by the insurgents, an example of which was the kidnapping of over two hundred 
(200) Chibok girls. 
At the formative stage of Boko Haram movement between 2005 and 2008, the 
leader, Mohammed Yusuf supported his disciples with one meal a day for each member; 
established youth employment scheme, which enabled disciples to go into petty trading and 
wheelbarrow pushing for a living. He also arranged marriage between the sect members to 
give them personal dignity and self-worth (Shettima 2014). After the death of Mohammed 
Yusuf on 26th July, 2009, as a result of an encounter with police and military operations, 
nobody took over this responsibility. The national and state governments from the region 
could not fill the vacuum. Political elites from the region were busy pursuing power at the 
national level, where they can benefit from corrupt practices in oil rentals, thereby, 
neglected their region. Leaders at the federal level also failed to create jobs and encourage 
school attendance for marginalized youths, especially the “Alamajiris” in North Eastern 
states. This failure by national and regional political elites to create employment, distribute 
resources equally, encourage school attendance and fight corruption created a gulf between 
the rich and the poor, and provided a fertile ground for recruitment of these jobless youths 
into Boko Haram Sects terrorist activities against the states, their institutions and citizens, 
confirming our economic deprivation-frustration-aggression theory. 
 
LINK BETWEEN NON-STATE ARM ED ISLAM IST JIHADISTS AND 
BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA 
In Nigeria’s context, the linkage between non-state armed Islamist groups and Boko 
Haram insurgency can be captured from video messages, statements of Islamist groups’ 
leaders, newspaper reports, maps and available statistics of Boko Haram terrorists’ attacks. 
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Data from these sources were content-analyzed, coded, categorized and subjected to 
thematic, historical, discourse, descriptive and explanatory analyses, in order to explain the 
pattern of linkage and collaboration between Boko Haram and non-state armed Islamist 
groups. Table 2 and figure 1, below capture incidents of Boko Haram’s attacks and adapted 
for our analysis and illustration. 
 
Table 2: Terror and Suicide attacks by Boko Haram Insurgency and Fatalities 
YEARS Suicide Attacks of 
Civilian deaths 
Injured Civilians 
2009 817 N/A 
2010 84 N/A 
2011 167 120 
2012 220 78 
2013 218 N/A 
2014 2,560 235 
Total 4,066 433 
Source: http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/boko-haram. 
 
Figure1 below shows towns annexed in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa as at 1st 
August, 2014. As these states were annexed, many civilians’ throats were slashed and Boko 
Haram hosted their flag and declared Gwazoa Islamic Caliphate. Boko Haram leaders 
even administered Sharia law for the Caliphate, as the incumbent Emir of the town fled. 
This is typical of ISIS operational tactics and methods in Iraq and Syria. Incidents of 
Boko Haram’s attacks target non-Muslims living in the Northern Nigeria and other 
civilians. However, they are also know for attacking fellow Muslims to enforce their 
interpretation of Islam. Espousing a strict hatred towards state authority, both to the 
governor and the police, the group has threatened Jihad against the government. Often 
targets Igbo civilians, a predominately Christian ethnic group. In 2009, an initiative by 
the Nigeria military to eradicate Boko Haram led to the death of the sect’s leaders, 
hundreds of their members and the destruction of their communities and properties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Boko Haram-attributed attacks in Nigeria since July 2009. 
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Source https://twitter.com /ogundamisi/status/455801622329716736/photo/1 
 
In August 2009, about a week after the death of Boko Haram’s leader, Mohammed 
Yusuf, the interim head of Boko Haram organization, published an ideological declaration 
regarding its goals and methods of operation. According to him, we support Osama b in 
Laden; we shall carry out his command in Nigeria until the country is completely converted 
to Islam, which is according to the wish of Allah (Doukhan 2012). Several years later, 
documents seized at Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottaabad in Pakistan showed that 
top level Boko Haram leaders had been in touch with Al-Qaeda with the past 18 months 
(Burke 2012). 
In early 2010, Abdelmalik Droukdel, the leader of AQIM, publicly offered Boko 
Haram assistance. In October 2010, AQIM’s media arm published a statement by Shekau, the 
first time AQIM disseminated an official message from another group. On July 13, 2010, 
Shekau issued another statement expressing solidarity with Al-Qaeda and threatened the US. 
AQIM and Boko Haram officials have referenced growing ties in public statements (Ploch 
2010). 
Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansaru in Algeria and A-Shabaab in 
Somali collaborate and have links with Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria from the 
findings in documentary and discourse analyses. From Al- Jazeera Television Report of 
June 14 of 2010, Abu Musab Abdal-Wadoud, the leader of AQIM said that “his group will 
provide Boko H aram with support and weapons to build strategic depth in Africa” 
(Aljazeera 2010). From US State Department, it was reported that Boko Haram has ties 
with AQIM, and members of the Sect receive military training and even with Jihadist 
group Al-Shabaab of Somalia (US State Department Report 2010). 
In addition, indicative of Boko Haram’s possible link with AQIM is its posting of 
video messages which conform to Al-Qaeda international jihad’s style. Shekau’s 
November, 2012 video messages posted online, appealed to wider Jihadist communities for 
support. In that video message, Shekau refers to fighters in Jihadist theatres as his 
“brothers”. For example, Shekau addresses the soldiers of the Islamist state, in Mali, “our 
brothers: Sheikhs in beloved Somalia; Our brothers: in Libya…..our brothers: Sheikhs in 
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oppressed Afghanistan….our brothers: Sheikhs in wounded Iraq….our brothers: She ikhs 
in wounded Iraq….our brothers: Sheikhs in Pakistan….our brothers: Sheikhs in 
Yemen…our brothers: Sheikhs in usurped Palestine….our brothers and other places where 
our brothers are doing jihad in name of Allah” (Roggio 2012). 
In that video message, Shekau warned Britain, America, Israel and Nigeria that the 
killing of Jihadist leaders will not defeat the groups. He further said that Boko Haram is 
with our Mujahid brothers in their fight again the Jews and the crusader Christians. This 
video message, according to Bill Roggio, an American commentator on military affairs is 
similar to tapes issued by Somalia’s Al-Shabaab in 2008, when the group was making 
overtures to join A l-Qaeda (Roggio 201 2). 
Boko Haram also has close operational relationship with Ansaru, a splinter group of 
Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In many ways, Ansaru is the international 
component of Boko Haram, although, it may not exist as distinct entity from it. When 
AQIM retreated during French military intervention in Mali, the two groups integrated 
(Heras and Zenn 2013). Boko Haram fighters also travelled to Mali in 2012, when the 
militant Salafist groups AQIM, Mujao, Movement for oneness and Jihad in West Africa and 
Ansaral-Dine controlled the Northern part of the country and established closer relations 
with these groups. The French intervention in Mali presented the group with possibilities 
for training, combat experience and operational cooperation with these organizations. 
Cameroon recently announced that their troop identified “two (2) Touareg Mali fighters 
enlisted by Boko Haram among 100 militants killed at her border with 
Nigeria”(Tchiroma 2014, 3) Touareg fighters fought in former Libya leader Muammer 
Gaddafi’s army and went on to lead the rebellion that in 2013 cut Mali into two. Besides, 
Boko Haram also relies on donations from Al-Qaeda and AQIM, in the form of money 
and military hardwares. Islamist groups from Saudi Arabia also donate funds to Boko 
Haram. 
Furthermore, the scale and methods of attack suggested that Boko Haram had 
adopted the tactics of AQUIM and ISIS currently fighting in Syria and Iraq. Boko Haram 
attacked UN Building in Nigeria in Abuja on 26th August, 2011. The bombing mastermind 
was identified by Nigerian State Security Services as Mamman Nur, a notorious Boko 
Haram member with a look to Al-Qaeda link who returned from Somalia before the attack 
(Adigun and Gambrella 2011). The Nigerian State Security Service’s (SSS) claim fits 
with June, 2011 statement by Boko Haram that some of its members had gone for training 
in Somalia: “we want to make it known that our Jihadists have arrived (in) Nigeria from 
Somalia where they got serious training on warfare from our brethren who made the country 
ungovernable and forced the interim government to relocate to  Kenya……despite the 
armoured carriers that they are boasting of, they are no match with the kind of training we 
acquired in Somalia (Oftedal 2013). Two videos later emerged purporting to show 
members of Boko Haram preparing for suicide attacks, including Mohammed Abul Barra, 
the suicide bomber of the UN building, launching a vague warning to “Obama and other 
infidels”. The voice said to be Shekau calls the Un headquarter, a “forum of all the global 
evil,” while also offering praise for Osama bin Laden”(Joy Online News 2011) This was 
similar to AQIM’s bombing of UN building in Algeria on December 11, 2007 (Jebnoun 
2008). Similar attack was carried on U N building in Baghdad (Iraq), which killed the 
Chief of Mission, Sergio Vierra de Mello and caused the UN to depart from Iraq. 
Again, the December 2013 night attach launched by Boko Haram fighters against 
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Nigerian Air Force base in the city of Maiduguri, in which a number of security personnel 
were killed and several aircraft destroyed is reminiscent of attacks by Al-Qaeda’s associates 
on important military bases in other theatres of war- the Taliban’s attack on Pakistan Naval 
Station Mehran in Karachi on May, 2011 and the Afghan Taliban’s assault on camp Baston 
in Helmand on September 2012 (Matziko 2014). The recent annexation of 20 towns in the 
states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, slashing the throats of their captors and hoisting of 
their flags in conquered territories is similar to ISIS activities in Syria and Iraq.  
The statements from video tapes, newspaper reports, tactics and methods of 
operation reflect forms of linkage and collaborations between the non-state armed Islamist 
groups and Boko Haram’s insurgency in Nigeria. The recent military successes registered 
by Boko Haram from 2013 to 2014, that resulted in 2,778 deaths, 235 injured citizens and 
abduction of 270 Chibok girls (as shown in violent terrorist attacks in North East of Nigeria, 
particularly Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, in table 2 and fig.1 below), compared to their 
operations between 2009 and 2012, violent attacks which resulted to 1,288 deaths is a clear 
indication that Boko Haram enjoys external military and financial support and cooperation 
from non-state armed Islamist groups of AQIM, Ansaru, Al-Shabaab, Touareg from Mali 
and Al-Qaeda/Taliban from. Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is justified with our map in 
figure 1, showing graphical representation of insurgency attacks in North Eastern States 
between August 1 and 31, 2014. It is obvious that the epicenter of 2013 and 2014 attacks 
by Boko Haram insurgency and were more significant than pockets of violence recorded 
between 2009 and 2012. This supports our thesis that religious, cultural (social theory) and 
psychological (identity theory) factors contribute to Boko Haram’s collaboration with 
Non-state armed Islamist groups to commit terrorist activities in Nigeria. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL POLICY AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 
Implications arising from the analysis and findings on social policy and management are: 
First, the public management implication is that Nigerian government should tackle 
the political and socio-economic challenges in the Northern part of Nigeria, especially by 
greater engagement and financial empowerment of the discontented communities. 
“Marshall Plan” should be formulated for the North Eastern states as was done in US 
sponsored European Recovery Program of April, 1948 to December, 1951, aimed at 
rehabilitating the economies of North Eastern states made up of Borno, Adamawa, Gombe, 
Taraba, Bauchi and Yobe. Nigeria should also entrench good governance at the national 
and regional levels in order to equitably distribute resources, create jobs for employment of 
idle youths, build schools (formal and vocational), and encourage its attendance for skill 
acquisition and empowerment leading to poverty reduction. Insecurity, poverty and 
unemployment have significantly affected the members of the society, especially in the 
rural areas. In failed states index, Nigeria was 14th in 2011, worldwide (Failed States Index 
2011). Therefore, a new social compact with Nigeria citizens that encompasses an economic 
program and projects that addresses poverty, unemployment, and should be addressed. 
Government should partner with such body as UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) to support the poor, which would help change the lives of many 
girls, women, youths and assist in closing the huge millennium development goals’ gaps. 
There is need to improve on governance and service delivery as well. Economic Reforms 
at all levels must be pursued, so that money appropriated for development projects and 
services actually deliver results. The anti-corruption agencies – the Economic and 
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Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corrupt Practices and other offences Commission 
(ICPC) should seriously check cases of frauds through which funds earmarked for 
development end up in private pockets. Nigeria should also fight corruption seriously by 
using surpluses from subsidy’s relief derived from fuel subsidy program to rehabilitate the 
economy of North Eastern states. There must be political will to combat corruption and 
entrench transparency and accountability in governance. 
Second, many economic activities have been closed as a result of violent activities of 
Boko Haram. For instance, “many telecommunication companies have lost their masts and 
base transceiver stations in Plateau, Gombe, Bornu, Yobe, Bauchi, and Kano. Each costs 
average of 40 million naira and 160 million to build a single mast” (Bisuga 2012 , 4-19). 
Moreover, agriculture and foreign investments are affected. Many foreign investors are 
scared of investing in the economy because of insecurity and kidnapping occasioned by 
Boko Haram terrorist activities. Farmers are scared of going to farm (Bamidele 2012) . 
Insecurity has created food crisis, such that prices of basic food items, like rice, yam, beans 
and fresh tomatoes have risen (Azinge and Bello 2011). This is a serious economic 
challenge as the cycle of poverty, hunger and unemployment would further drive the 
disadvantaged and marginalized people in the area to crimes and religious extremism. The 
impact of violence on hospitality industry is devastating. People have relocated hotel 
businesses which have generating revenue from tourists have been relocated to other safe 
areas in the South. Commercial and business activities have crumbled and some have fled 
because of high level of insecurity. Banks and their customers are operating under difficult 
situations and have reduced their business hours for security reasons. About percent of 
industries have been shut down leading to scourge of unemployment. Small and Medium 
scale industries have relocated to Abuja. Many people have lost their lives and others 
rendered homeless. The global implication is that the activities of Boko Haram would affect 
bilateral trade between Nigeria and other nations of the world, especially: Mali, Cameroon, 
Niger, Republic of Benin, Ghana and other West African Countries.  
Third, the killing, maiming of civilians, destroying churches and calling for 
expulsion of Southerners and Northern Christians by the Boko Haram members is damaging 
the North socially and politically. The trust and unity in diversity among Nigerians have 
been eroded, and given way to mutual suspicion and hatred, which may degenerate into 
self-determination agitation by minorities. This has political, social and cultural 
implications for the national development. 
Fourth, defense and security implication is that the police and military personnel 
should be trained in urban warfare, intelligence gathering, and equipped with modern 
military technological hardware. Inter-Agency rivalry and mistrust among military and 
para-military service personnel should be eliminated, while, institutional flaws, such as 
unsound recruitment should be addressed. Links and networks to extremist organizations 
must be dis-connected through the establishment of multi-national joint task force to patrol 
and secure porous borders. There is urgent need to disconnect the network of non-state 
armed Islamist groups’ terrorist collaboration with Boko Haram Sects. This can be achieved 
by establishing transnational and multi-national joint military taskforce with neighboring 
countries that share common border with Nigeria, for example, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. 
This joint military taskforce would also help to check transnational crimes such as: human 
trafficking, illegal migration, arms smuggling and infiltration of non-state armed Islamist 
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jihadists into domestic militias. This is a big agenda for the government but not 
insurmountable, if the political will is there to counter Boko Haram’s insurgency. This 
would make external link between Non-state armed Islamist jihadists and Boko Haram Sect 
to be disconnected in terms of getting arm supplies, mercenaries and funds. This will cut off 
their supply chains and break the network of command and control. Complicity and 
collusion between the security personnel, political elites with Boko Haram insurgency 
should be meticulously investigated and all culprits exposed, prosecuted and jailed, if found 
culpable. This would deter others in future sabotage and collusion by other sympathizers of 
Boko Haram Sector. 
Fifth, government should tackle the political and socio-economic problems of the 
North Eastern part of Nigeria through dialogue and negotiation with marginalized 
communities as alternative conflict resolution strategy to address the grievances of 
insurgents. Insurgents are regarded as representatives of deeper issues or grievances within 
a society, such as social inequalities, poverty, unemployment, corruption and bad 
governance. This strategy if adopted would defeat insurgents’ propaganda of oppression, 
social injustice and marginalization by winning the hearts and minds of the affected target 
population to the side of government– a process that involves dialogue, compromise and 
negotiation. Even though, we detest insurgents methods and tactics, their grievances are 
often seen as legitimate, if pursued peacefully and through political means as done by 
Philippines and likes of Nelson Mandela, Gandhi and Xanana Gusanao, who renounce 
violence but seek same objectives through political and peaceful means.  
Finally, Government should launch and sustain a concerted Civic education 
program to halt politicization of religion, educate citizens to respect the rights of fellow 
citizens. This would promote tolerance and encourage mutual respect in inter-personal 
relations. Such awareness would help build religious tolerance, mutual respect for each 
other’s rights and unity in Nigeria. 
 
CONCLUSION 
From the findings, it is obvious that there is wide discontent among people of North 
Central/Eastern States of Nigeria, made up of Kano, Borno, Adamawa, Gombe, Yobe, 
Taraba and Bauchi, because of economic deprivation, social inequality, unemployment, 
poverty, corruption, and bad governance by both national and regional political elites. This 
socio-economic deprivation has created a gulf between the “rich” and “poor”, snowballing 
into frustration and leading to aggression on government officials, government agencies,  
institutions and members of the society. The motivation to muster international support 
from other oppressed Muslims in other parts of the world, made it possible for Islamist 
extremists to find a fertile ground to recruit marginalized and frustrated youths in North 
Eastern states, which has led to terrorist activities against the state with the aim of reforming 
governance with Islamic or sharia laws. Hence, the collaboration and cooperation between 
non-state armed Islamist groups and Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. 
Using secondary analysis, the paper has qualitatively and historically described the 
interplay of socio-economic, psychological, religious and cultural (socio-economic 
deprivation, frustration-aggression, social learning and identity framework) factors to 
explain Boko Haram insurgency link with Non-state armed Islamist groups. Thus, the 
geometric upsurge of unemployment rates, paradoxical poverty in the midst of plenty due to 
corruption and illogical marginalization, suspicion, social injustice and bad governance 
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snowballed into insurrection of Boko Haram terrorist attacks with its attendant socio-
economic and political implications for Nigeria. 
However, we suggest that future study should interview and administer survey 
questionnaire (if possible) to Boko Haram’s leaders to know their grievances, collaborators 
and sponsors, besides being motivated by Islamic Jihads in other countries. This would 
enable future researcher verify and replicate this study using quantitative analysis to 
establish the linkage between non-state armed Islamist jihadists and Boko Haram’s 
insurgency in Nigeria. 
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